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THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE

ASSOCIATION COURT AND POSITIVE
ACTION
By THOMAS TRELOGAN, STEVE MAZURANA & PAUL HODAPP

I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper our aim is to update the reader regarding positive action
law in the European Union (EU). 1 We consider the recent judgment of the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Court, which summarizes the
state of the law. 2 We begin with a short introduction to positive action law
in the European Union.

II. BACKGROUND-POSITIVE ACTION LAW IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
"Positive action" is the European name for what Americans call
"affirmative action."3 A Communication from the European Commission
to the European Parliament and the European Council 4 describes positive
action as embracing:
all measures which aim to counter the effects of past discrimination, to

1. In 1957 the EU was created to enable six European states to become a single
economic entity. See generally NEILL NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION

23-31 (4th ed. 1999).

2. Case E-1/02, EFTA Surveillance Authority v. The Kingdom of Norway, 1 C.M.L.R.
2003),
available
at
(EFTA
Court
5-13
and
36-43
23
<www.eftacourt.lu/pdf/EI 02Decision-E.pdf>.
3. Katherine Cox, Positive Action in the European Union: From Kalanke to
Marschall,8 COLUM. J.GENDER & L. 101, 105 (1998) (discussing how the government of
the United Kingdom may have chosen the phrase "positive action" as an alternative to
"affirmative action" because of the controversy associated with the latter phrase in the
United States).
4. The Commission is the primary initiator of EU legislation. The Council of Ministers
is the primary decision-making body. The Parliament exercises limited advisory and
supervisory powers over legislation. The fourth principal EU institution is the Court of
Justice, which we will discuss later. For a general discussion of the functions of each of
these bodies, see NUGENT, supra note 1, at 99-241.
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eliminate existing discrimination and to promote equality of opportunity
of
between women and men, particularly in relation to types or levels
5
jobs where members of one sex are significantly underrepresented.
The sources of EU law include treaties and legislation. For our

purposes the most important treaty is the Treaty of Amsterdam (Treaty),
which provides the EU with the power to take "appropriate action to
combat discrimination based on sex." 6 The Treaty also provides that
member states may maintain and adopt "measures providing for specific

advantages in order to make it easier for the underrepresented sex to pursue
a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in
professional careers." '

The purpose of these provisions is to insure full

equality in practice for men and women in employment.
The most important legislation is the Equal Treatment Directive
(Directive).8 The Directive prohibits all sex discrimination, but it allows
measures that promote equality of opportunity for men and women-in

particular measures that remove existing inequalities that affect women's
opportunities in access to employment, including promotion and vocational

training. 9 The Directive was drafted to focus solely on formal equality of

5. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
on the interpretation of the judgment of the Court of Justice on 17 October 1995 in Case C450/93, Kalanke v. FreieHansestadtBremen, COM(96)88 final at 3.
6. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treatises
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, art. 13,
1997 O.J. (C 340) 173. For a clear discussion of the Treaty in relation to positive action, see
Rebecca Means, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen: The Significance of the Kalanke
Decision on the Future of Positive Action in the European Union, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1087, 1089-94 (1997) and Elizabeth Defeis, The Treaty of Amsterdam: The Next Step
Towards GenderEquality, 23 B. C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 30-33 (1999).
7. Treaty of Amsterdam art. 141(4). Article 2 also provides "equality between men
and women" as one of the tasks of the EU. Article 3(2) states that the EU is to "aim to
eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women." Article 13
allows the EU to "take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex." And
Article 137 includes "equality between men and women with regard to labour market
opportunities and treatment at work" as activities of member states that the EU promises to
support. Finally, Declaration 28 annexed to the Treaty and commenting on Article 141
states that in adopting measures to ensure the equality of men and women in working life,
member states "should, in the first instance, aim at improving the situation of women."
8. NUGENT, supra note 1, at 246-47. Directives are binding as to the result to be
achieved but leave to the member states the choice of form and methods to achieve that
result. Directives apply only to member states and are not enforceable against purely
private parties. Christopher McCrudden, The Effectiveness of European Equality Law:
National Mechanisms for Enforcing Gender Equality Law in the Light of European
Requirements, 13 OXFORD J. LEG. ST. 320, 323 (1993).
9. Council Directive 76/207 EEC of 9 February 1976 on the Implementation of the
Principle of Equal Treatment for Men and Women as Regards Access to Employment,
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opportunity for women working outside the home. Legal advisers to the EU
believed that existing treaties allowed the EU to legislate only in
employment matters. They argued that any stronger conception of equality
than formal equality of opportunity would require that the EU intrude into
the distribution of family responsibilities, and that legislation in relation to
the family would have exceeded the limits of legality. Commentators note
that this reasoning demonstrates how family and work have been
constructed as mutually exclusive spheres in EU law.10 In our opinion, the
Treaty has weakened this separation and allows positive action that may
intrude on the distribution of family responsibilities.
III. EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY V. THE
KINGDOM OF NORWAY
In its judgment in this case, the Court summarized the EU law on
positive action so clearly that its judgment is an excellent introduction to
EU positive action law. But before we turn to this judgment, we should
explain the relationship between the EFTA Court that decided this case and
the European Court of Justice.
A. The European Court ofJustice and the EFTA Court
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the fourth major political
institution of the EU. At present the Court has twenty-five judges who are
appointed for six-year terms. Member states typically nominate "men of
affairs" who have been involved in government but have limited judicial
experience.
Currently, there are two female judges on the court.
Judgments of the court are deliberated in secret and decided by majority
Vocational Training and Promotion, and Working Conditions, art. 2, 1976 OJ (L39) 40.
Council Directive 2002/73 EEC of 23 September 2002 on the Implementation of the
Principle of Equal Treatment for Men and Women as Regards access to Employment,
Vocational Training and Promotion, and Working Conditions, 2002 OJ (L269) 15, replaces
Article 2(4) with a new paragraph 8 that states, "Member States may maintain or adopt
measures within the meaning of Article 141(4) of the Treaty with a view to ensuring full
equality in practice between men and women." EU legal documents are available online at
<http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/index.html>.
In our view the language of the Treaty is more forceful and more favorable to
women's equality than the language of the Directive. Arguably the Directive allows positive
action for women only by removing obstacles to equal opportunity for women to compete
against men for jobs. The Treaty goes beyond this formal equality and allows positive action
to achieve substantive equality for women in the workplace, that is, a proportional
representation of men and women in employment.
10. Gillian More, Equality of Treatment in European Community Law, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FOUNDATIONAL SUBJFCTS OF LAW 261-78 (Anne Bottomly ed., 1996);
Gillian More, Equal Treatment ofthe Sexes in ECLaw, 1 FEM. LEGAL ST. 45, 55-59 (1993).
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vote without a published dissent." The Court is aided in its decisionmaking by eight Advocates General who write opinions for the Court's
consideration. These opinions are more detailed in their reasoning than the
Court's judgments and can be helpful in understanding the Court's
decision. 12
The typical procedure in these cases is that a case is assigned to a
Judge Reporter and an Advocate General. After a hearing, if it is
necessary, the Advocate General issues an opinion. The Judge Reporter
informs the Court whether he or she intends to follow the opinion and
whether a discussion with a chamber of the Court is necessary. The Court
may issue a judgment that simply refers to the Advocate General's
Opinion, or the Judge Reporter may write a draft judgment for the Court. 3
All other things being equal, the Court interprets the law
teleologically. The Court considers EU law to constitute a grand design
and sees individual legal materials as constituents of that design. The law
has a purpose that the Court must discover and make effective.' 4 In this
process of discovery, the Court is not bound by the common law doctrine
of precedent. In principle, the Court could revise its view of a law's
purpose at any time. Nevertheless, the Court does not lightly create
conflicts among its judgments, and national courts consider the Court's
judgments applicable and binding throughout the member states for all
future cases.' 5
Cases reach the Court in a number of ways. In positive action cases,
the Court's judgments are issued in the form of preliminary rulings
concerning the legal questions presented by the national courts of the
member states. The Court interprets the relevant EU legal authorities to
determine if the challenged positive action plan is consistent with EU law.

11. For a general discussion of the Court, see NUGENT, supra note 1, at 262-75 and Jo
Hunt, The Legal System of the European Union, in THE EUROPEAN UNION HANDBOOK 213,
219-20 (Jackie Gower ed., 2002).
12. A. ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 7-9 (1999); L.
Molinari, The Effect of the Kalanke Decision on the European Union, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. RFv.
591, 601-02 (1997); K.P.E. LASOCK, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 289-

94 (7th ed. 2001) (discussing how the office of Advocates-General, like much of the Court's
procedure, is derived from French law; and how the Advocates-General are the "embodied
conscience of the Court" who speak only for law and justice and not the particular interests
of the EU or its member states). For the most recent information, visit the Court's Web site
at <http://curia.eu.int/en/>.
13.

ARTICLE 177 REFERENCES TO THE EUROPEAN COURT: POLICY AND PRACTICE 24-26

(Mads Andenas ed., 1994).
14. Molinari, supranote 12, at 602-03 n.83-84.
15. LASOK, supra note 12, at 163.
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The Court does not decide the case for the parties. The Court issues its
preliminary ruling regarding the consistency of the positive action plan
with EU law and the national court decides the case for the parties. The
national court is bound to follow the judgment of the ECJ. 16
The EFTA Court 17 has jurisdiction over the three EFTA states that are
parties to the European Economic Area Agreement (EEAA) but not
members of the EU, namely Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. The aim
of the EEAA is similar to that of the EU: to guarantee free trade among the
member states, to provide fair competition, and to abolish discrimination in
all of the EEAA states, the EU member states, and the three non-member
states. The Agreement incorporates pertinent EU law, including the Equal
Treatment Directive, and is supervised in two different ways: (1) the
European Commission supervises compliance with the Agreement by the
EU member states, and (2) the EFTA Surveillance Authority supervises the
three non-member states. The ECJ has jurisdiction over disputes involving
the EU member states and the EFTA Court has jurisdiction over the three
non-member states. The EFTA Court considers the decisions of the ECJ on
EU law to be relevant to its decisions on similar issues in order to ensure
uniformity between the EU and the EFTA.
The EFTA Court has three judges. Each of the three countries
nominates one judge who serves a three-year term. Typically the Court
proceedings, which include written and oral submissions, are conducted in
English.
B. The Judgment of the EFTA Court in EFTA Surveillance Authority v.
The Kingdom of Norway
1. Issue and Conclusion
The EFTA Surveillance Authority sought a declaration from the Court
that Norway had failed to fulfill its obligations under the EEA Agreement

16. Id. (discussing how the ECJ is a "continental court" because it has no law-making
powers and merely fills in gaps in legislation). An interesting and important question is to
what extent the Court articulates constitutional principles that are fundamental to EU law.
Clearly, the ECJ is not a constitutional court in the American sense. In preliminary ruling
cases the ECJ is not an appellate court that reviews the decisions of lower courts and strikes
down legislation inconsistent with a constitutional document. For a discussion of this issue,
see Kendall Thomas, Constitutional Equality: The Political Economy of Recognition:
Affirmative Action Discourse and Constitutional Equality in Germany and the U.S.A., 5
COLUM. J. EuR. L. 329, 351 n.94 (1999).
17. Information about the EFTA Court is available on its website at
<www.eftacourt.lu/introduction.asp>.
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and the Equal Treatment Directive because of legislation that reserved a
certain number of academic positions solely for women. The Court agreed
with the Surveillance Authority and declared that by reserving academic
positions solely for women, Norway had failed to meet
its obligations
8
under the Agreement and the Equal Treatment Directive.'
2. Facts9
Norway's University Act permitted advertisements for academic posts
that were open only to the underrepresented sex, in this case, women. In
1998 the Norwegian government assigned 20 post-doctoral research grants
to the University of Oslo. The University marked all these positions for
women in academic areas where women were underrepresented and the
recruitment of women needed to be strengthened. Of the 179 post-doctoral
appointments at the University from 1998-2001, only twenty-nine were
reserved for women. Of the 227 permanent academic appointments during
that period, only four were reserved for women. Under the University Plan
for 2000-2004, ten post-doctoral and twelve permanent positions were
reserved for women. The University would distribute the positions to
faculties where women were considerably underrepresented.
The
University was to give priority to fields in which fewer than 10% of the
academics were women, and in which women in permanent positions were
glaringly underrepresented given the number of female students.
3. Reasoning
a. Introduction
On one level, this decision was easy for the EFTA Court. The Court
of Justice had clearly ruled that positive action plans that guarantee women
absolute priority for appointment in public service are incompatible with
the Equal Treatment Directive.
Since the Norwegian law and the
University of Oslo guaranteed women an absolute priority for certain
academic positions, Norway had failed to live up to its obligations under
the Directive that is a part of the EEA Agreement. As the Court noted,
these positive action plans go beyond promoting equality of opportunity
and seek to establish an equality of representation.2 °

18. Case E-1/02, EFTA Surveillance Authority v. The Kingdom of Norway, 1 C.M.L.R.
23
5 and 59 (EFTA Court 2003), available at <http://www.eftacourt.lu/pdf/
E_1_02Decision-E.pdft>.
19. Id.% 2-4.
20. Id.137.
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On a deeper level, however, the Court's judgment is interesting and
important not only because a different set of judges is examining the issue
but also because these judges are presented with arguments by the
defendant, Norway, that bring together all of the recent ECJ judgments and
all of the legal arguments against those judgments. One unfortunate
omission from the Court's reasoning is any consideration of the effect of
the amendments to the EU Treaty and Directive-provisions that are not
part, or not yet part, of the EEA Agreement. The Court recognizes that EU
positive action law is expanding. Thus, the Court recommends that in the
future defendants present evidence to the Court regarding the factors that
place women at a disadvantage and call for positive action. The Court also
recommends that defendants include in their plans provisions weighing
female life experiences, such as family responsibilities, positively in
assessing the qualifications of candidates.2 1
b. PriorECJpositive actionjudgments
The Court summarizes the ECJ's leading positive action judgments as
follows.

22

In Kalanke,23 the ECJ rejected absolute priorities for women in

employment. In Marschall,24 the ECJ heard evidence that stereotypes
regarding women prevented them from being fairly considered in
competition for jobs with men. To allow women the same chances to
compete for jobs, the ECJ allowed preferential treatment for women when
they were underrepresented in a particular position, when individual female
candidates were equally qualified with men, and when positive action plans
contained a flexibility clause guaranteeing male candidates an objective
assessment of their individual circumstances that could rebut the
presumption favoring the female candidate.
The Court in Badeck25 established three new rules for evaluating

21. Id.
55-57. The first recommendation appears to be based on the ECJ Judgment
in Marschalland the second on its Judgment in Badeck. These judgments will be discussed
later in this paper.
22. Id. TT 37-43.
23. Case C-450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3051, 1
C.M.L.R. 175 TT 18-19 (1996).
24. Case C-409/95, Marschall v. Land Nordrhein Westphalen, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6363 TT 9
and 35.
25. Case C-158/97, Badeck and others, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875
26-27. Binding
prescriptions favoring the hiring of women in academic positions and in training positions
are common in Europe, and especially in Germany. ANNE PETERS, WOMEN, QUOTAS AND
CONSTITmIONS 134-35 (1999). The EFTA Court did not discuss the final two issues in
Badeck. The ECJ upheld an ambiguous preference for women that appears to require that at
least as many women as men be interviewed for positions where women are
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positive action plans. First, plans could include factors for evaluating the
qualifications of candidates that were intended to aid women in reducing
inequalities that actually occur in their social life, including their domestic
responsibilities. For example, capabilities and experiences acquired in
family work may be taken into account if they are important to the
suitability, performance, and capability of candidates. In addition, family
status and partner income are irrelevant, as are part-time work, leaves, and
delays in training that are the result of looking after children or dependents
in need of care. Finally, seniority, age, and the date of the last promotion
should not be given undue weight in assessing a candidate's qualifications.
These factors had to be expressed in gender-neutral terms so that they
could benefit men and women alike.
Second, the Court held that binding targets that required certain
academic positions to be filled by a percentage of women that was at least
equal to the percentage of women among graduates, holders of higher
degrees, or students in each discipline were consistent with the Directive.
The Court reasoned that the targets were not inflexible quotas, because the
targets were based not on some scheme that was being imposed, but on a
matter of fact-namely, the number of women who had received the
appropriate training.
Third, at least half of the training places for occupations requiring
training were set aside for women who were underrepresented in these
occupations. The measure addressed clear barriers to equal opportunity for
women. However, these set-asides were not inflexible quotas in practice,
because women had to be qualified for the training or else qualified men,
trained in private programs, would assume these places.
The EFTA Court recognized that the Norwegian post-doctoral
positions were similar to training positions.26 Both are temporary and both
underrepresented. This result is consistent with the Court's training decision, which, in
effect, held that the Directive should be more liberally interpreted when it is applied to preemployment positive action plans. Again, this result is consistent with German practice.
Some German states require that when women are underrepresented, one-half of the
candidates offered an interview for a position must be women. One state requires that all
qualified women must be offered an interview. Id. at 134-35. The ECJ also upheld what it
described as a non-mandatory recommendation that one-half of the appointments to
employee representative bodies, and administrative and supervisory bodies should be
women. Most German states require that half the members of an official organization
should be women. Id. at 136. After a decade of positive action in some of the German
states, the proportion of positions occupied by women increased by less than one percent.
Id. at 210 n.525.
26. Case E-1/02, EFTA Surveillance Authority v. The Kingdom of Norway, 1 C.M.L.R.
23
49-50 (EFTA Court 2003), available at <http://www.eftacourt.lu/pdf!E-l_02DecisionE.pdf>.
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are intended to develop the competencies to compete for higher-level
positions. In addition, the Court recognized positive action plans for
training positions may be justified by a "restricted concept of equality of
opportunity." But according to the EFTA Court, the plan still could not be
inflexible, and similar opportunities in the private sector had to be
available. In rejecting Norway's plan, the EFTA Court distinguished the
facts in its case from the facts in Badeck. There the plan was clear that
when an insufficient number of qualified women applied for training, men
could assume the additional places. By contrast, the Norway positive
action plan did not rule out the possibility that an unqualified female
candidate could be selected for one of the post-doctoral positions.27 In
addition, the ECJ in Badeck was clear that training positions were available
to men in the private sector, even if they were more costly than the
subsidized government training. By contrast, the EFTA Court noted that
private alternatives for post-doctoral positions appeared to be rather
limited.
In Abrahamsson28 the ECJ interpreted the savings clause that it
requires of all positive action plans as allowing male candidates to be
objectively assessed for the position in light of their individual
circumstances. The Court held that an objective assessment must be
transparent and amenable to review and must not allow for an arbitrary
assessment of the candidates' qualifications. At issue was a Swedish
decision to promote a female candidate to full professor even though she
was not the best qualified candidate. According to the Swedish court, the
preference for the female candidate was not rebutted because the
differences in the candidates' qualifications were not so great as to make it
likely that her job performance would be inferior to that of the bestqualified male candidate. The ECJ rejected the claim that the Swedish
standard of objectivity was consistent with the ECJ standard. Instead, the

27. In light of the evidence in note 28 infra that women who are rated just as competent
as men must be 2.5 times as productive as men, we wonder what it can mean in terms of
fairness to say that a woman is under-qualified for an academic position, especially given
the dismal results of a decade of positive action in Germany.
28. Case C-407/98, Abrahamsson v. Fogelqvist, 2000 E.C.R. 1-5539. The 1995
Swedish regulation is referred to as the "Tham package" after a former minister of
education. In 1995, fewer than ten percent of the full professors in Sweden were women.
One argument for the Tham package was that a more equal representation of women in
higher research positions would positively affect the scope and content of academic
research. Ann Numhauser-Henning, Swedish Sex Equality Law before the European Court
of Justice, 30 INDus. L.J. 121, 121-22 (2001). According to a recent Swedish study, women
applying for postdoctoral fellowships had to be 2.5 times more productive than the average
male applicant to receive the same competence score. PETERS, supra note 25, at 303 n. 122.
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ECJ concluded that the Swedish standard was so lacking in specificity that
it, in effect, granted women an absolute preference, contrary to the
Directive.
According to the EFTA Court, since the Norwegian plan went even
further than had the Swedish plan in Abrahamsson, it too ran afoul of the
Equal Treatment Directive. The Court meant that even though the Swedish
plan had allowed in principle for the objective assessment of all candidates,
the ECJ had rejected it, and the Norwegian plan contained no basis for
assessing the credentials of male candidates for the post-doctoral
29
positions.
c. Conclusion
The EFTA Court summarized the judgments of the ECJ Court
concerning what positive action plans are consistent with the Equal
Treatment Directive as follows. First, positive action is permissible to
achieve substantive equality and not just formal equality.3 ° Second,

29. This passing remark of the EFTA Court is interesting regarding the ECJ's judgment
in Abrahamsson. The EFTA Court seems to be saying that the ECJ could have upheld the
Swedish plan by reinterpreting the phrase "objective criteria" in the Swedish Constitution.
The interpretation of the phrase that the ECJ said was lacking in specificity came from the
7-15 and 25. But the
Swedish University Appeals Board. Abrahamsson, supra note 28,
ECJ need not have asserted a superior position in interpreting Swedish law. The Court
might simply have suggested to Sweden that if "objectivity" retained the meaning given to it
by the Swedish Board, then its positive action plans were inconsistent with the Directive. If,
however, objectivity were interpreted along the lines of the Marschalljudgment, then the
inconsistency would disappear. Even if the ECJ did not wish to go this far in offering
advice regarding Swedish law, the Court might have pointed out that the inconsistency
between Swedish law and the Directive really resided in what the Swedish interpretation of
objectivity left unsaid. The Court might have stressed that the Swedish test of objectivity in
terms of a prediction of the probability that one candidate's job performance will be inferior
to that of another candidate requires a Marschall-like evaluation of the individual
qualifications of each candidate. The inconsistency between EU law and Swedish law
existed only if the Swedish Board failed to make this evaluation in this case. But no helpful
remarks to save the Swedish law came from the ECJ. The remark about the possibility of
saving the Swedish law leads us to question whether the EFTA Court was obliquely
criticizing the ECJ as heavy-handed in foreclosing the positive action path of Scandinavian
countries that are considered more progressive in Europe.
43-45. One way to picture the formal/substantive equality
30. Kingdom of Norway
distinction is in terms of an analogy with a foot race. Substantive equality requires that all
racers start with the same chances of winning: each racer is able to take advantage of the
opportunities to compete and has, in principle, an equal chance of winning. By contrast,
formal equality merely requires the removal of all obstacles that might keep anyone from
competing. Background conditions may still stand in the way of all the competitors' having
an equal chance of winning. More distinctions are possible and are made in the literature
regarding substantive equality: equality of result, equality of opportunity, equality of
substantive rights, and equality of respect. For a fuller discussion, see Catherine Barnard
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positive action, as an exception to the fundamental individual right to be
free from discrimination, must satisfy the principle of proportionality that
the means - positive action - must be appropriate and necessary to achieve
the end - gender equality. Thus, positive action must balance improvement
for the underrepresented gender with the opportunity for members of the
opposite gender to have their qualifications objectively assessed.
The key to the Court's finding that Norway failed to fulfill its
obligations under the EEA Agreement and the Directive is that the Norway
positive action plan might allow women applicants with inadequate
qualifications to be selected in lieu of the best qualified male candidates. 3'
The importance of the Norway decision lies in the careful consideration
that the Court gives to the arguments of Norway in favor of its positive
action plan.
d. Norway's arguments in favor of its positive action plan
First, Norway argued that gender was a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) for the at-issue academic position. The Court simply
rejected the argument on the ground that the BFOQ exception to the
equality principle had been limited by the ECJ to certain police or military
32
positions reserved for men because of the public security requirements.
Second, Norway relied on the ECJ's Judgment in Lommers, in which
the Court allowed a positive action plan that reserved a number of
subsidized nursery positions for female officials. The EFTA Court
distinguished Lommers from the present case because in an emergency,
male officials would be allowed access to the nursery slots and because
nursery slots remained available in the private sector. 33 Thus, the childand Bob Hepple, Substantive Equality, 59 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 562, 565-67 (2000). See also
McCrudden, supra note 8, at 326-27 (discussing how normal equality or individual justice is
concerned with cleansing the decision-making process and not with the results of the
process; how it is individualistic in orientation and yet universalistic in that both men and
women are to be equally protected; how it respects efficiency and merit within the economic
market; and how substantive equality or group justice tends to redistribute market share so
that the position of women in the market is improved relative to that of men). Badeck has
been viewed as the first judgment of the ECJ in a positive action case to abandon its
exclusive reliance on the formal equality principle and allow substantive equality or equality
of result as a permissible goal of positive action. See Kristina Kuchhold, European
Developments - Badeck - The Third German Reference on Positive Action, 30 INDUS. L.J.

116 (2001).
31. Kingdom of Norway 45. In its answer to written questions from the Court,
Norway admitted that this situation was possible.
32. Id. 46.
33. Id. 47. The ECJ saw these child-care quotas as similar to the absolute training
quotas that were allowed in Badeck in so far as they are "designed to eliminate the causes of
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care positive action plan was proportional to the end of reducing de facto
equality, while the Norway plan was not proportional in that it did not
balance the interests of men and women.
Third, Norway relied on the ECJ's Judgment in Schnorbus,34 in which
the ECJ allowed a two-year automatic preference for legal training for
veterans of compulsory public service that was mandated only for men.
The EFTA Court distinguished Schnorbus from the present case on the
grounds that that discrimination against women had been objectively
justified by the two-year requirement for compulsory public service and
because the preference was intended to counter-balance the two-year delay
in men's training.
Fourth, Norway argued that because the post-doctoral positions were
new positions, no men would lose positions as a result of their being filled
by women. 35 The Court pointed out that men could lose positions in the
future if evaluations of the positive action plan showed that it was not
working to end gender discrimination. Under these circumstances, the plan
might mandate the allocation of a larger percentage of the total number of
post-doctoral positions to women. Because Norway failed to explain to the
Court that this could not happen, the Court rejected Norway's argument.
Fifth, Norway argued that the professorships earmarked for women
were merely temporary positions because they would cease to exist upon
the retirement of the women who held them.3 6 The Court rejected the
argument on the ground that the Directive as interpreted by the ECJ does
not permit a temporariness defense in situations such as Norway's, in
women's reduced opportunities of access to employment and careers and intended to
improve the ability of women to compete on the labour market and pursue a career on an
equal footing with men." Case C-158/97, Badeck and others, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 7 33.
34. Kingdom of Norway 48 (citing Case C-79/99, Schnorbus v. Land Hessen, 2000
E.C.R. 1-10997). Based on its judgment in Marschall,the ECJ might have reasoned that the
automatic veteran's preference was inconsistent with the Directive unless women were
allowed individualized consideration to rebut the preference, for example, with evidence of
hardships of their own that delayed their training. The ECJ's failure to recognize this line of
reasoning suggests that the Marschall savings clause is limited to discrimination cases
where the cause of the inequality is gender stereotyping such as was evidenced in
Marschall. Further, the gender stereotyping must be immediate or direct, because it is
possible that the male-only compulsory public service requirement was based on gender
stereotyping. Thus, the automatic veteran's preference was one step removed from
stereotyping and thus permissible according to the ECJ.
35. Id. 752.
36. Id. 7 53-54. The Court noted that those parts of Norway's positive action plan in
academia that did not involve earmarking positions exclusively for women were not
challenged by the EFTA Surveillance Authority, for example, targets for new professorships
and priority in the allocation of positions to fields having fewer than 10% female academics
and fields having a high proportion of female students and graduates.
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which a positive action plan is inflexible and grants an absolute priority to
female candidates.37
Sixth, Norway submitted that the Court should evaluate its plan under
the new Article 141(4) of the Treaty of Amsterdam and under the new
38
Directive 2002/73/EC amending the 1976 Equal Treatment Directive.
The Court refused on the ground that these provisions have not been made
a part of EEA law. But the Court recognized that changes in the Treaty and
the Directive have given EU member states greater competency to confront
gender equality. For example, Articles 2 and 3(2) require member states to
promote gender equality. Article 13 gives the Council competency to take
Article 141(4)
appropriate action to combat sex discrimination.
emphasizes the goal of full equality in practice between men and women in
working life, and to this end, permits member states to adopt and maintain
measures that give specific advantages to members of the underrepresented
gender to make it easier for those persons to pursue a vocation or to prevent
or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers.
The Court went further and offered advice to Norway in revising the
challenged portions of its positive action plan. The Court recommended
that until the changes in EU law were incorporated into EEA law, Norway
should identify the evidence of the factors in academia that place female
candidates at a disadvantage against competing male candidates. Second,
its plans should include provisions that give weight to the life experiences
of women outside of academia that are relevant to qualifications for higher
academic positions.
Seventh, Norway submitted that the Court should evaluate its plan
under international law - in particular, the Covenant on the Elimination of
all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEAFDAW). 39 The Court
refused on the ground that the ECJ had not relied on international law in its
judgments interpreting the Directive and because the positive action
provisions in international law are permissive and not mandatory.
IV. CONCLUSION
Discrimination is an infection throughout the world that we all must

37. The short duration of an affirmative action plan is one factor considered by the
United States courts in evaluating American plans. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa
Clara, 480 U.S. 616, 630 (1987) (gender discrimination); United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 216 (1979) (race discrimination).
38. Kingdom of Norway 55-57.
39. Id. 58.
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We hope to keep the discussion of gender
work to eradicate.4 °
discrimination alive in Europe and America by reporting on new cases that
remind us how far we have progressed and how much remains to be done.
New cases remind us of the new methods of affirmative action that are
being used to bring about equality for women.

40. See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action:
An InternationalHuman Rights Dialogue, 1 RUTGERs RACE & L. REv. 193 (1999).

